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Abstract
We revisit the influential economic growth model by Lucas (1988) [“On the mechanics of economic de-
velopment.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 22(1):3-42], assuming that households optimally allocate
consumption and education over the life-cycle given an exogenous interest rate and exogenous wages.
We show that in such a partial equilibrium setting, the original two-state (physical capital and human
capital) optimization problem can be decomposed into two single-state optimal control models. This
transformation allows us to rigorously prove the existence of a singular control describing the allocation
of education time along a balanced growth path. We derive a constructive condition for a singular
control to exist and show that under this condition infinitely many singular controls are optimal in the
individual household problem. In contrast to the original general equilibrium framework in which an
agent always chooses part-time education and part-time work, in our framework such an agent might
find it optimal to allocate her whole available time to education at the beginning of her life and to focus
on labor supply only when she is older.
Keywords: Optimal lifetime education, optimal control, singular control, economic growth, human cap-
ital.
JEL Classification: C60, O41, I20.
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1 Introduction
In his seminal paper “On the Mechanics of Economic Growth” Robert E. Lucas presents an economic growth
model where homogeneous individuals maximize their lifetime utility by choosing an optimal consumption
path as well as the optimal allocation of their available time in education (human capital accumulation)
and production. The problem that the individual faces in the Lucas model is specified as an optimal
control problem with two state variables: physical capital and human capital. The existence of a unique
solution along a balanced growth path is derived under the assumptions of (i) perfect foresight, (ii) perfect
competition in labor and capital markets, and (iii) that the aggregate decisions of agents have repercussions
on interest rates and wages through general equilibrium mechanisms.
In this paper we provide a rigorous analytical assessment of the Lucas (1988) model in a partial equilibrium
reformulation. Such an analysis provides new insights into the mechanics of the model and delivers new
results that can be useful when analyzing the mechanics of individual education decisions for a given interest
rate and a given wage rate. In particular, we show that the partial equilibrium version of the Lucas model
can be rewritten as a two-stage optimization problem in which the choice with respect to time devoted to
work versus time devoted to human capital accumulation and the choice with respect to consumption can
be disentangled from each other. In the first stage, agents optimally choose the division of time between
human capital accumulation and production so as to maximize lifetime income, while in the second stage
agents distribute consumption optimally over their infinite lives, given their lifetime income.
As our central result, we show that infinitely many optimal solutions exist for the time allocation between
work and education in the partial equilibrium formulation of the Lucas model. For example, two feasible
optimal strategies for individuals could be (i) to allocate the whole available time to education when young
and to focus on labor supply when old (ii) to switch back and forth between full-time education and
full-time work. The reason for such a result is that there are no repercussions of individual labor market
decisions on the equilibrium wage rate. We show that the general equilibrium setting in Lucas (1988) acts
as one equilibrium selection rule (of potentially many). However, other mechanisms such as nonlinearities
in human capital accumulation, can also lead to the selection of a unique singular control.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the standard Lucas model of economic growth.
Section 3 introduces the partial equilibrium reformulation of the model, together with the transformations
of the model based on a two-stage formulation. Section 4 solves the partial equilibrium Lucas model. In
Section 5, we present two possible equilibrium selection mechanisms (general equilibrium and nonlinearities
in human capital accumulation dynamics). Section 6 concludes and presents paths of further research.
2 The Lucas Model of Economic Growth
The model of Lucas (1988) builds on the optimization problem of a representative agent who maximizes
the discounted flow of utility derived from consumption over her infinite life. At every point in time, t, the
agent is endowed with one unit of time that can be split between the part of it which is dedicated to the
production of output, u(t), and to the production of human capital, 1− u(t). Effective labor (i.e., human
capital augmented labor input), u(t)h(t), is compensated by the wage rate, denoted as w(t). For savings,
the interest rate r(t) is paid. Instantaneous utility is iso-elastic and future utility is discounted with the
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time preference rate ρ > 0. The problem of the representative individual is thus given by
max
c(·),u(·)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
c(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ dt, (1)
subject to
k˙(t) =r(t)k(t) + w(t)h(t)u(t)− c(t), k(0) = k0 > 0, (2)
h˙(t) =χh(t)[1− u(t)], h(0) = h0 > 0, (3)
u(t) ∈ [0, 1], c(t) ≥ 0, lim
t→∞ e
−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsk(t) ≥ 0, (4)
where c(t) denotes consumption per capita at time t, k(t) refers to physical capital per capita, h(t)
denotes human capital per capita, and θ > 0 and χ > 0 are parameters measuring the relative risk
aversion of individuals and the productivity of education, respectively. The No Ponzi Game Restriction,
limt→∞ e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsk(t) ≥ 0, rules out infinite borrowing to finance consumption. Although it is not imposed
explicitly by Lucas (1988), it follows implicitly from the transversality condition of the optimization problem.
Assuming N(t) homogeneous agents, aggregate physical capital is given byK(t) = N(t)k(t) and aggregate
effective labor in the production process amounts to L(t) = N(t)h(t)u(t). Both aggregate physical capital
and aggregate effective labor are used to produce output Y (t) according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function with constant technology A > 0 and an elasticity of output with respect to physical capital of
0 < α < 1,
Y (t) = AK(t)αL(t)1−α.
Output can be consumed or invested in physical capital. The wage rate per unit of effective labor w(t)
and the capital rental rate R(t) are determined on competitive markets and thus profit maximization at
the firm level (assuming that the price of output is chosen as the numeraire) implies
w(t) =∂Y (t)
∂L(t) = A(1− α)
[
K(t)
L(t)
]α
,
R(t) = ∂Y (t)
∂K(t) = Aα
[
L(t)
K(t)
]1−α
.
The (net) interest rate paid to capital owners is given by r(t) = R(t)− δ, where δ > 0 is the depreciation
rate of capital. Without loss of generality, we assume a stationary population and normalize N(t) = 1 for
all t.
As compared to Lucas (1988), the model put forward is simpler because it abstracts from population
growth and from externalities of human capital. For the optimization problem, Lucas (1988) derives a
balanced growth path in the general equilibrium setting. The optimal equilibrium allocation for u(t) is
thus determined as the market equilibrium between firms and households. Lucas (1988) finds a unique
and singular solution (0 < u∗(t) < 1 for all t). In our contribution, we aim to gain more insight into the
singular solution of the optimal control model by analyzing the problem of the representative agent in a
partial equilibrium setting and assessing potential solution selection mechanisms in this setting.
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3 Reformulating the Lucas Model in a Partial Equilibrium Setting
In the partial equilibrium reformulation of the model we assume that the paths of the interest rate and
the wage rate, r(t) and w(t), are given, known to the agent and not affected by the agent’s decisions on
savings and/or labor market participation. The representative agent maximizes thus her discounted lifetime
utility given by equation (1), subject to constraints (2)–(4), conditional on given paths of r(t) and w(t).
Assume in addition that w(·) is a continuously differentiable function.
The optimization problem given by (1)–(4) can be reformulated as a two-stage problem. The agent first
chooses optimally the division of time between production and education in order to maximize her total
discounted income over the life cycle. In the second stage, the agent decides on the optimal distribution of
consumption over the life cycle, given income. In the model, the feasibility of such a decomposition rests
on the assumptions of perfect capital markets and of the lack of disutility of work beyond the opportunity
costs of investing in human capital. At any given point in time, agents have unconstrained access to the
credit market at the prevailing interest rate, without frictions or credit constraints. Such a decomposition is
not feasible if imperfections in the credit market are present. For instance, if there exists a credit constraint
that restricts the amount of capital the agent can borrow, the specific path of income may matter for the
distribution of consumption over time. At the beginning of the life cycle the constraint might be binding.
In this case, the agent is forced to work if she wants to consume. This restricts the agent in her decisions
on optimal education and consumption and renders the decomposition of the original Lucas model into a
two stage optimization problem infeasible. The decomposition is also not possible in case that leisure is
considered as an additional source of utility in a nonlinear way.
The equivalence result requires the assumption that the positive-valued function w(t) is such that for any
admissible control u(t) and the corresponding trajectory h(t),∫ ∞
0
e−r(t,0)w(t)h(t)u(t) dt <∞,
where r(t, s) =
∫ t
s r(τ) dτ is the accumulated interest rate between time s and time t (Assumption A0). If
there was some control u(t) for which the integral above was infinite, the No Ponzi Game constraint (4)
would imply infinite consumption at time t = 0, which would be economically infeasible. The finiteness of
total discounted lifetime income is ensured by adopting this assumption.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption A0 hold. Then the original problem (1)–(4) is equivalent to the combination
of the problem of choosing the division of time between production and education in order to maximize
total discounted income and the problem of choosing a consumption path given maximum total discounted
income.
Consider an arbitrary admissible path u(t) and its corresponding human capital path h(t) being a solution
to (3). Let x(t) and z(t) be solutions to
x˙(t) = r(t)x(t)− c(t), x(0) = k0 +
∫ ∞
0
e−r(t,0)w(t)h(t)u(t)dt (5)
and
z˙(t) = r(t)z(t) + w(t)h(t)u(t), z(0) = −
∫ ∞
0
e−r(t,0)w(t)h(t)u(t)dt. (6)
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Then, k(t) = x(t) + z(t) for all t ≥ 0. Note from (6) that
lim
t→∞ z(t) = limt→∞
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s,0)w(t)h(t)u(t)dt = 0
and the No Ponzi Game condition (4) leads to
lim
t→∞ e
−r(t,0)k(t) = lim
t→∞ e
−r(t,0)x(t) + lim
t→∞ e
−r(t,0)z(t) = lim
t→∞ e
−r(t,0)x(t) ≥ 0. (7)
The state variable z(t) therefore does not play any role for the utility optimization problem (1) and can be
omitted in further considerations.
Consider the No Ponzi Game condition (7). From (5) it follows that
x(t) = er(t,0)
[
k0 +
∫ ∞
0
e−r(s,0)w(s)h(s)u(s) ds−
∫ t
0
e−r(s,0)c(s) ds
]
and so (7) requires that ∫ ∞
0
e−r(s,0)c(s) ds ≤ k0 +
∫ ∞
0
e−r(s,0)w(s)h(s)u(s) ds.
This inequality implies that the set of admissible controls c(t) is the largest if
∫∞
0 e
−r(s,0)w(s)h(s)u(s) ds
takes the maximal possible value. Thus, maximizing the right hand side will allow maximizing utility as
given by (1). Therefore, the original problem (1)–(4) is reducible to the two separate problems put forward
above.
We define the education problem to be the maximization problem of the total discounted lifetime income
given by
max
u(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−r(t,0)w(t)u(t)h(t) dt, (8)
subject to
h˙(t) = χh(t)[1− u(t)], h(0) = h0. (9)
Note that the dynamic decision of optimal consumption allocation is taken with a static initial condition
that corresponds to the constraint that is set by the total discounted lifetime income. Thus the education
problem is defined as follows
max
c(·)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
c(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ dt, (10)
subject to
x˙(t) =r(t)x(t)− c(t), x(0) = x0 +
∫ ∞
0
e−r(t,0)w(t)u(t)h(t) dt, (11)
lim
t→∞ e
−r(t,0)x(t) ≥ 0. (12)
Problem (10)-(12) is referred to as consumption problem.
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The consumption problem has been studied in the literature and its optimal solution is given by the following
expressions
c∗(t) = c∗0e
r(t,0)−ρt
θ , c∗0 =
x(0)∫∞
0 e
−r(t,0)e
r(t,0)−ρt
θ dt
. (13)
The proof can be found in standard textbooks, (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2009, pp. 294-298).
This decomposition simplifies the mathematical analysis of the original model considerably by reducing a
two-state control optimization problem to two optimization problems each having one state variable and
one control. Intuitively, this result proves that we do not need to think of agents as making their decisions
on u(t) and c(t) simultaneously. Instead, the decision process can be thought of as being composed of two
stages. In the first stage, agents maximize their income by optimally choosing the division of time between
education and work. In the second stage, optimal consumption is determined. This decision is independent
from the actual flow of income but only depends on its net present value at time zero.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption A0 hold, u∗(·) be an optimal control in the education problem and h∗(·)
be the trajectory corresponding to u∗(·). Then there exists an adjoint variable ξ(·) defined as
ξ(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s,0)w(s)u∗(s)e−χ
∫ s
t
[1−u∗(τ)] dτ ds (14)
that satisfies almost everywhere the adjoint equation
− ξ˙(t) = χ[1− u∗(t)]ξ(t) + e−r(t,0)w(t)u∗(t). (15)
The optimal control u∗(t) maximizes the Hamiltonian
H(h, u, ξ, t) = e−r(t,0)w(t)hu+ χξh(1− u)
evaluated along the optimal path h = h∗(t), ξ = ξ(t) over all admissible u ∈ [0, 1] for almost all t ∈ [0,∞).
As a consequence,
u∗(t) =

1, if e−r(t,0)w(t)− χξ(t) > 0,
0, if e−r(t,0)w(t)− χξ(t) < 0,
singular, if e−r(t,0)w(t)− χξ(t) = 0.
(16)
Proof. As the integrand in the definition of ξ(t) in equation (14) is equal (up to a multiplicative constant)
to the integrand in (8), the integral in (14) is absolutely convergent and finite. Thus, the statements of
the proposition (in particular, the explicit representation of the adjoint variable) follow from Theorem 4.1
in Aseev and Veliov (2014).
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4 Multiplicity of Optimal Solutions in the Partial Equilibrium Setting
Lucas (1988) shows that if a balanced growth path exists in the optimization problem proposed, in general
equilibrium a unique and singular solution exists. We now analyze these assertions in the framework of
partial equilibrium. We show that in partial equilibrium uniqueness of the solution is not given and instead
infinitely many optimal solutions exist. As a side result, we obtain a constructive condition on the interest
and wage variable for a singular solution to exist.
Theorem 1. If an optimal balanced growth path exists for problem (1) subject to (2)–(4) with posi-
tive human capital growth, infinitely many optimal solutions for the education problem exist and can be
characterized by
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
u(s) ds→∞. (17)
Out of the infinitely many solutions that exist in partial equilibrium, the general equilibrium mechanism in
Lucas (1988) identifies one of them. Other possible mechanisms to choose a unique solution are discussed
in Section 5.
The proof of the theorem follows at the end of the section. We start by formulating one finding that is
required for the proof in the form of a corollary.
Corollary 1. If a singular solution exists for problem (1) subject to (2)–(4), then
w˙(t)
w(t) = [r(t)− χ], t ∈ [0,∞). (18)
All admissible controls u(t) that satisfy equation (17) lead to the same value of the objective function
in the education problem and the discounted future income is proportional to the initial level of human
capital, ∫ ∞
0
e−r(t,0)w(t)u(t)h(t) dt = h(0)w(0)
χ
. (19)
This implies that, for a singular solution in partial equilibrium with a constant wage rate per unit of effective
labor and a constant interest rate, the interest rate must satisfy that r(t) ≡ χ, while the wage per unit
of effective labor may be any arbitrary positive constant. In general equilibrium, r(t) = r = χ typically
defines a unique wage w(t) = w(χ) through the assumption of competitive factor markets.
The following theorem provides some special cases in which a balanced growth path exists in partial
equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Let the wage rate per unit of effective labor be constant and positive, w(t) ≡ w > 0, and
the interest rate be equal to the efficiency of human capital production, r(t) ≡ χ, for all t ∈ [0,∞), and
let additionally χ(1− θ) < ρ and 0 < (χ− ρ)/(χθ) < 1. Then a balanced growth path exists.
Note that, due to the partial equilibrium setting, the assertion of the theorem is independent of k(0) and
h(0). This implies that for two agents with different initial human capital h1(0) 6= h2(0), both choosing the
balanced growth path solution, the difference h1(t)−h2(t) grows exponentially over time, but the fraction
h1(t)/h2(t) remains constant. The same holds true for physical capital.
7
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove Theorem 1 in three steps. First, we show that the existence of an opti-
mal balanced growth path with positive human capital growth implies the existence of a singular solution.
Then, we derive a necessary condition for an optimal solution to exist. Finally, we show that infinitely many
optimal solutions exist.
The assumption of an optimal balanced growth path with positive human capital growth implies that
for some constant d > 0, it holds that d = ˙h(t)/h(t) = χ[1 − u∗(t)]. Thus, u∗(t) is constant itself,
u∗(t) ≡ 1− d/χ < 1, t ∈ [0,∞). The boundary value u∗(t) ≡ 0 has objective value zero in the education
problem, which is clearly not optimal because controls that lead to a positive objective value exist. There-
fore, 0 < u∗(t) < 1 for almost all t ∈ [0,∞) which proves that a singular optimal solution exists.
Next, we derive the necessary condition for a singular solution presented in Corollary 1 by using the optimality
conditions of Proposition 2. Consider the switching function ζ(·), defined as
ζ(t) = e−r(t,0)w(t)− χξ(t),
with a derivative over time given by
ζ˙(t) = −r(t)e−r(t,0)w(t) + e−r(t,0)w˙(t)− χξ˙(t) =
= −r(t)e−r(t,0)w(t) + e−r(t,0)w˙(t) + χ[1− u∗(t)]e−r(t,0)w(t) + χe−r(t,0)w(t)u∗(t),
where the latter equality holds due to the adjoint equation (15). If a control is singular over the interval
[t1, t2) ⊂ [0,∞), then the switching function ζ(t) is zero, thus
χξ(t) = e−r(t,0)w(t).
Therefore,
ζ˙(t) = e−r(t,0)w(t)
{
w˙(t)
w(t) − [r(t)− χ]
}
(20)
for all t ∈ [t1, t2). The existence of a singular solution implies ζ˙(t) = 0 and therefore the condition given
by equation (18).
Note that the conditions ζ(t) = 0 and ζ˙(t) = 0 are independent of the control u(t). If these conditions
are fulfilled, every control u(t) satisfies the necessary optimality conditions and therefore infinitely many
solutions and infinitely many singular solutions exist. We now show that all of them are optimal as well.
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Considering any control u(t), the objective value of the education problem is given by∫ ∞
0
e−r(t,0)w(t)u(t)h(t) dt =
=
∫ ∞
0
e−r(t,0)eχtw(t)u(t)h(0)e−χ
∫ t
0 u(s) ds dt =
=e−r(t,0)eχtw(t)h(0)
χ
e−χ
∫ t
0 u(s) ds
∣∣∣∞
0
−
−
∫ ∞
0
[w˙(t) + χw(t)− r(t)w(t)]e−r(t,0)eχth(0)e−χ
∫ t
0 u(s) ds dt.
Since the wage rate satisfies (18), the integrand of the second term is zero. Equation (18) further implies
that w(t) = w(0)er(t,0)e−χt, which leads to the first term being equal to
w(0)h(0)
χ
[
1− e−χ limt→∞
∫ t
0 u(s) ds
]
.
The objective value is thus maximized and equal to w(0)h(0)/χ for any control u(t) satisfying equation
(17). This equation is in turn satisfied by infinitely many solutions, which proves the claim of the theorem.
Note that it follows that along every optimal control, discounted future income is equal to the initial level
human capital multiplied by w(t)/χ, that is, the expression given by equation (19).
Proof of Theorem 2. If r(t) and w(t) are constant, it follows that r(t) ≡ χ, t ∈ [0,∞), while the wage
rate per unit of effective labor is undetermined, w(t) ≡ w > 0.
Consider the maximal achievable income I(t) := χk(t) + wh(t), which is equal to the income at time t
under constant interest rates and wages if the agent works full time. Taking the derivative of I(t) with
respect to time, we obtain
I˙(t) = χk˙(t) + wh˙(t) =
= χ[χk(t) + wu(t)h(t)− c(t)] + w{h(t)χ[1− u(t)]} =
= χ[I(t)− c(t)].
Recalling the fact pointed out in the proof of Theorem 1 that discounted future income equals wh(t)/χ,
independently of the control u(t), optimal consumption c∗(t) can be expressed as
c∗(t) = k(t) +
∫∞
t e
−r(s,t)wu(s)h(s) ds∫∞
t e
−r(s,t)e
r(s,t)−ρ(s−t)
θ ds
= [χk(t) + wh(t)]
[
ρ− χ(1− θ)
θχ
]
.
This expression follows from equation (13) by means of a time shift. Exchanging 0 in equation (13) by t
and t in equation (13) by s and inserting this representation of c∗(t) in the equation for I˙(t), we obtain
that the maximal achievable income grows at a constant rate, independently of the control u(t),
I˙(t)
I(t) =
χ− ρ
θ
.
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Due to our assumption 0 < (χ − ρ)/(χθ) < 1, there exists u ∈ (0, 1) such that ˙h(t)/h(t) = χ(1 − u) =
(χ− ρ)/θ. Inserting this u and the expression for c∗(t) in the equation for k˙(t), we obtain
k˙(t)
k(t) =
χ− ρ
θ
.
Due to Corollary 1, the control u(t) ≡ u is also optimal, which concludes our proof of the existence of a
balanced growth path.
5 Solution Selection Mechanisms in the Lucas Model
In this section we discuss some approaches serving to select a unique optimal solution. Our results for the
partial equilibrium formulation of the Lucas model show that agents have infinitely many optimal choices for
the control u(t). Among the several solution selection mechanisms available to overcome this indeterminacy
we highlight two of them which introduce nonlinearity in the Hamiltonian of the education problem: the
general equilibrium formulation of the model (as in Lucas, 1988) and nonlinearity in the human capital
accumulation function.
If the interest rate and the wage rate are determined endogenously in a general equilibrium setting, the
problem of a representative agent has a unique solution, as it is shown in the original paper by Lucas
(1988). This is the case because labor supply is increasing with respect to the wage rate, while labor
demand is decreasing. Consequently, there exists a unique intersection of labor demand and labor supply
at the unique equilibrium wage. If the representative agent decreases (increases) her labor supply, wages
rise (fall) and agents have incentives to increase (decrease) labor supply accordingly. Thus, the general
equilibrium framework acts as a “selector” of a unique optimal choice of control.
Analytically, for a given control u(t), a production function Y (t) = F [K(t), L(t)] and the assumption that
the wage equals the marginal productivity of labor, it holds that
w[t, u(t)] = ∂F [K(t), L(t)]
∂L(t) |[K(t),L(t)]=[K(t),u(t)H(t)].
Inserting this expression into the Hamiltonian of the education problem, the optimal control u∗(t) maximizes
H[t, h, u, ξ] = w[t, u(t)]u(t)h(t)e−r(t,0) + χξ(t)h(t)[1− u(t)]
over the set u(t) ∈ [0, 1]. If w[t, u(t)]u(t) + χξ(t)er(t,0) is a concave function in u(t), then a unique
maximum u∗(t) exists. This holds true, for example, for a Cobb-Douglas production function (as used in
the original Lucas model). In the Cobb-Douglas case, the unique optimal control is given by
u∗(t) =

[
ξ(t)χer(t,0)
h(t)1−αA(1−α)2k(t)α
]−1
α
, if
[
ξ(t)χer(t,0)
h(t)1−αA(1−α)2k(t)α
]−1
α ≤ 1,
1, if
[
ξ(t)χer(t,0)
h(t)1−αA(1−α)2k(t)α
]−1
α
> 1.
A second mechanism that acts as a solution selector can be conceptualized by including a non-linearity
in the human capital production. In the partial equilibrium setting, the linearity of h˙(t) and k˙(t) with
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respect to u(t) and h(t), together with the equality of marginal returns in equilibrium, implies that agents
are indifferent between all controls u(t) that result in the same amount of working time. Thus, switching
back and forth between education and work becomes also an optimal behavior for individuals in the partial
equilibrium formulation of the Lucas model. Introducing a nonlinearity with respect to u(t) in the human
capital accumulation equation is another possible way to achieve uniqueness in the optimal control of the
partial equilibrium problem.
In the more general formulation of the Lucas-Uzawa model in Uzawa (1965), the following functional form
is proposed for the dynamics of human capital,
h˙(t) = h(t)G[1− u(t)],
where G(·) is an increasing function with G(0) = 0, non-negative first derivative and non-positive second
derivative. Furthermore, G(1) is assumed not to be very large compared to the discount rate (which
translates into an assumption on the relations between χ, ρ, and θ in our formulation of the problem) and
G(0) +G′(0) is assumed sufficiently large.
Replacing the linearity assumption implied by the human capital accumulation equation (3)in our analysis
by G[1− u(t)] = χ[1− u(t)]ν with ν < 1, the Hamiltonian of the education problem becomes
H[t, h, u, ξ] = e−r(t,0)w(t)u(t)h(t) + ξχ[1− u(t)]ν ,
and its first order condition with respect to u(t) is given by
e−r(t,0)w(t)h(t)− ξ(t)νχh(t)[1− u(t)]ν−1 = 0.
The boundary solution u(t) = 1 is not optimal since e−r(t,0)w(t)h(t) is strictly positive for all t. The
assumption ν < 1 implies that u∗(t) is uniquely determined by
u∗(t) =
 0, if 1−
[
e−r(t,0)w(t)h(t)
ξ(t)νχh(t)
] 1
ν−1
< 0,
1−
[
e−r(t,0)w(t)h(t)
ξ(t)νχh(t)
] 1
ν−1
, if 1−
[
e−r(t,0)w(t)h(t)
ξ(t)νχh(t)
] 1
ν−1 ≥ 0.
6 Conclusions and paths of further research
We show that reformulating the Lucas model in the partial equilibrium setting provides new insights to
the optimal control problem that economic agents face in the original specification. In particular, we show
that the partial equilibrium reformulation of the optimization problem in Lucas (1988) exhibits multiple
optimal solutions. It may be optimal for the representative agent to allocate her whole available time to
education at the beginning of her life and to focus on labor supply only at later periods. Even switching
back and forth between full-time education and full-time work is a feasible and optimal solution for rational
individuals. We present two equilibrium selection mechanisms that are based on introducing nonlinearity
into the optimization problem: assuming a general equilibrium setting or assuming nonlinearities in human
capital accumulation.
11
Our analysis also provides additional results concerning the equivalence of different formulations of the
partial equilibrium Lucas model. Conditional on given paths of interest rates and wages, we show that
the optimization problem in Lucas (1988) can be rewritten as a two-stage optimization problem. In the
first stage, agents solve the problem of optimally choosing the division of time between human capital
accumulation and production so as to maximize lifetime income. In the second stage, agents distribute
consumption optimally over their infinite lives, given lifetime income.
Our results show that if a balanced growth path exists, all solutions that satisfy limt→∞
∫ t
0 u(s) ds → ∞
are optimal. Thus, all of the following stylized categories of agent behavior are optimal in the framework
of the Lucas model in the partial equilibrium setting:
• No Learning: Working full time without additional education, u(t) ≡ 1 for all t ∈ [0,∞).
• Continuous Learning: Working part time and educating the rest of the time 0 < u(t) ≡ u < 1 for all
t ∈ [0,∞).
• Educational Leave: Switching back and forth between work and education, e.g. u(t) ≡ 1 for t ∈
[2n, 2n+ 1) and u(t) ≡ 0 for t ∈ [2n− 1, 2n) and n ∈ N.
• Standard Schooling: Full-time education, u(t) ≡ 0, for t ∈ [0, s] and full-time work, u(t) ≡ 1, for
t ∈ (s,∞).
The assumptions for the equivalence are the existence of a singular solution, the linearity of the human
capital dynamics and the infinite lifetime of the agents, or, in the dynastic interpretation, that human
capital is fully inherited. If human capital accumulation was less costly for younger individuals than older
ones, it is plausible that full time education is optimal in younger years, perhaps followed by a period
in which partial education (either continuous learning or educational leave) is optimal, and finally older
individuals would work full time. In case of a finite lifetime without passing the acquired human capital
to children, we would expect similarly a decline in education at older ages. Altogether, this implies that
such a framework is able to deliver realistic age-education profiles. Non-linear human capital production
would shift the optimal solution either to continuous learning (in case of human capital production being
concave in time devoted for learning) or to educational leave (convexity in time devoted for learning). Such
richness of results for human capital dynamics makes the reformulation of the model put forward in this
study particularly promising for further research on optimal education paths in economic growth models.
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